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THE ESTATE OF BLACK
By EDWARD C. KING, Trust Officer, InternationalTrust Co.

HE story that follows is fiction.

Neither the facts nor

the characters are real, but all the things that are described
as happening have happened, and may happen again.
The rules of law are in accordance with what the writer
believes to be the weight of authority. This is the story:
John Black, of Denver, died in 1920, leaving a will
which read as follows:
"I, John Black, of Denver, make this my will. I give and devise
my entire estate to Sam Jones, of Denver, in trust to hold, manage, sell,
mortgage, convey, transfer, invest, and reinvest the same, as he in his
discretion deems best, and free from the jurisdiction of the probate
court; to pay the income to my son John as long as he lives, and, as
soon as practicable after my son's death, to distribute the entire remainder of the estate to my said son's descendants per stirpes. I appoint my
friend, Richard Roe, executor, with the same powers and discretion with
respect to my estate as I have above conferred upon my trustee.
"In witness whereof, etc."

The estate consisted of the following items:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A farm in Illinois worth $100,000.
A farm in Colorado worth $50,000.
Stock of a local dry goods company worth $25,000.
High-grade telephone company stock worth $25,000.

The four items had a total value (as of the date of death) of

$200,000.
The will was admitted to probate in Colorado and subsequently in Illinois; Roe, qualified as executor in both states.
Claims amounting to $100,000 were filed in the Colorado court and duly allowed. Fees and costs were estimated
at $4,000.
No claims were filed in Illinois, where expenses and taxes
were estifnated at $4,000.
The executor, like a good bridge player, looked over the
situation before he made a play. The stock in the Dry Goods
Company had paid 10 % for many years; it seemed very safe,
so he decided to hold it if possible. The telephone stock was
considered a high-grade investment stock. He decided to hold
it also. The Illinois farm was increasing in value very rapidly
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but it was too distant to be easily managed and he decided to
sell it as soon as a purchaser could be found. The Colorado
farm, which was declining in value because of litigation over
water rights, he decided to hold as a home for the testator's
son, but to mortgage it to raise additional money with which
to pay debts. He talked all his plans over with the testator's
son, who was of age, and he approved the plan, so the executor proceeded as follows:
(1)
He borrowed $25,000 from a mortgage company and secured the note by a mortgage on the Colorado farm. He was careful to
sign the note and mortgage "Richard Roe, as executor of the estate of
John Black, deceased."
(2)
He sold the Illinois farm for $100,000 net. From thissum
he paid fees, costs, and taxes in Illinois amounting to $4,000 and turned
over to himself, as the domiciliary executor in Colorado, the $96,000
balance.
(3)
From the $25,000 derived from mortgaging the Colorado
farm and the $96,000 from Illinois he paid all claims, costs, and fees
in Colorado and had a cash surplus in the principal account amounting
to $17,000. His administration seemed complete, except for the routine
of closing and turning over the residue to the trustees.

He now reviewed the situation. Six months had elapsed.
In six more he could close the estate. The original estate had
been appraised at $200,000. He had paid claims and expenses amounting to $108,000 and he had on hand:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The equity in the Colorado farm now esti$25,000
----------mated to be worth
The dry goods company stock, not looking
- 25,000
quite as safe as before, but still worth
30,000
The telephone stock now worth --17,000
Principal cash
...........------------------------A total of ------------

$97,000

He congratulated himself. He had been honest and had.
exercised his best judgment throughout. He had charged a
small fee. The value of the estate had increased during his
administration, and the son and beneficiary of the testator was
well pleased.
He held a conference with the testator's son John, and
they decided to invest the $17,000 in some oil stock on a tip
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that it was due for a rise. They bought. The stock went up.
The executor sold for $24,000 and put the money in U. S.
Government bonds. Again he had a tip on the oil stock, sold
the governments, bought the stock again, this time $24,000
worth, and it dropped. He sold at $22,000 (still $5,000
ahead), and bought governments. At this juncture, a little
more than two months before the closing date, the Dry Goods
Company (the stock of which he had held) suddenly failed
and its stock was worthless.
Made cautious by this loss, the executor sold his telephone stock, which had continued to rise, for $35,000 and
put this money into governments.
In due time he published notice of final settlement in
Colorado and Illinois, filed his final reports, asked that they
be approved, and that, upon turning over the property in his
hands to Jones, as trustee, he be discharged.
In the Illinois report he asked to be credited with
$100,000 as evidenced by vouchers showing payment of
$4,000 in expenses, fees, and taxes, and $96,000 paid to himself as domiciliary executor in Colorado. This seemed unobjectionable.
In his Colorado report he asked to be credited with:
(1)

The government bonds, worth $57,000.

(2)

The Colorado farm, in which there was an equity of
$25,000.
(3) Interest earned during administration represented by cash
(4)

on hand, $4,000.
Claims and expenses paid (as per vouchers which he submitted) amounting to $104,000.

He was satisfied with this report, too, although there had
been some loss. He felt that no one could have anticipated
the failure of the Dry Goods Company and he had made up
some of the loss in other ways.
At this stage the executor began to encounter trouble.
The trustee objected to the Illinois report on the ground that
the Illinois executor had wrongfully applied the $96,000 paid
to the Colorado executor. The trustee claimed that the
money, being the proceeds of the Illinois land and, from the
equitable point of view, still being Illinois land, could be
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reached by creditors only by the method provided in the Illinois statute; that is to say, by filing claims in apt time in the
Illinois Probate Court. The Illinois Probate Court, on the
authority of a case decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
held that no claims having been filed in Illinois, the Illinois
real estate, or the proceeds thereof, passed directly to the trustee, free from the claims of Colorado creditors, and directed
the executor to make good the $96,000 deficit. This he did
by selling the equity in the Colorado farm for $25,000, and
the government bonds for $57,000, and by supplementing
this $82,000 with the $4,000 interest and $10,000 of his
own money. He was advised that an appeal from the decision of the Illinois Probate Court would be a waste of money
-and he had none to waste. He took a receipt from the trustee and was discharged in Illinois.
He now had nothing left in the Colorado estate. He
was in a bad spot and felt that he had been imposed upon.
He had not asked for the job; he had used his discretion as the
will said he might; he was out $10,000 of his own money and
didn't know whether he could get it back from the creditors
or not.
He filed an amendment to his Colorado final report in
which he asked to be charged with the proceeds of the farm,
$50,000; the proceeds of telephone stock, $35,000; a profit
on the oil stock, $5,000, and interest of $4,000; and to be
cre4ited with payments of expenses, claims, etc., amounting
to $104,000, leaving the estate indebted to him in the sum of
$10,000.
The trustee, however, objected to the report, alleging
that the executor had no authority to hold the stock of the
Dry Goods Company, which was not a legal investment, except at his own risk, and was therefore chargeable with the
sum which the stock would have brought at any time during
the first nine months of the -idministration, namely $25,000.
The executor's answer was, first, that by the terms of the
will he had discretionary power with respect to the retention
or sale of investments; that he had exercised that discretion,
and that he was not, therefore, chargeable with any loss; and,
secondly, that even if he had no authority to hold the stock
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the loss was offset by a $15,000 profit in the telephone stock
and oil stock and $10,000 paid by him in settlement of claims
and expenses.
On the first point the court, in accordance with what is
probably the weight of authority, held that power conferred
upon a trustee to make investments "in his discretion" does
not permit a trustee to invest in securities not authorized by
statute, and, on the second point, that the executor could set
off the $10,000 contributed by him, but must make good the
other $15,000, the rule being:
"A trustee who is liable for a loss occasioned by one breach of
trust cannot reduce the amount of his liability by deducting the amount
of a gain which has accrued through another and distinct breach of
trust; but if the two breaches of trust are not distinct, the trustee is
accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only with the net loss
resulting therefrom."

The trustee, Jones, also claimed that the executor was
chargeable with a loss of $2,000 incurred when he sold
$24,000 worth of government bonds and invested the proceeds in oil stock, which he subsequently sold for $22,000.
Again the court sustained the objection and surcharged the
executor an additional $2,000. In support of his ruling the
court said:

* * If the trustee in breach of trust purchases property which
he subsequently sells at a profit and he invests the proceeds for the trust
in proper trust securities and subsequently he sells the securities and with
the proceeds makes a purchase which is not a proper trust investment
and which he sells at a loss, he is chargeable with such loss and cannot
deduct the amount of the profit which resulted from the previous breach
of trust."
"*

The executor paid everything and was ultimately
Charged with
The dry goods company
$25,000
stock ------------The proceeds of the tele35,000
phone stock --------The profit in the oil
7,000
stock
------The proceeds of the
Colorado farm -------- .50,600
4,000
Interest
-------------------$121,000

Credited with
Payments as per vouchers
-------------- $104,000
17,000
----------------Cash

and the estate was closed and he was discharged.

$121,000
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The executor had acted in good faith and had been surcharged to the extent of $27,000, but he was not yet in the
clear.
You will recall that Roe (as executor) had signed a
$25,000 mortgage note. The holder ultimately foreclosed,
took a $5,000 deficiency judgment against Roe personally,
and collected. Roe sued the trustee for reimbursement. How
he came out I don't know. The rule with respect to Roe's
liability is as stated in Loring's A Trustee's Handbook, pazes
92 and 93, where it is said:
"If the trustee has the power to do the act which he contracts to
do he may bind the trust-estate in his hands and in those of his sliccessors in the trust by his express contract.
"Whether the trustee has the power to 0o the act or not, the contract will bind him personally unless he stipulates in the contract that
he shall not be personally liable, or its equivalent that he shall be liable
to the extent of the trust assets only."

Sam Jones, the trustee who caused Roe so much trouble,
was much better informed on trust matters than Roe. When
he took over the trust estate he did so with the intention of
avoiding all of Roe's mistakes. The will conferred upon him
power to invest and reinvest as he in his discretion deemed
best, but he now knew that this confined him to Colorado
legals and he acted accordingly.
The entire estate distributed to the trustee by the Illinois
executor and the Colorado executor amounted to $113,000;
$4,000 of which the trustee considered to be interest earned
on the Colorado assets during administration. The trustee
paid this $4,000 of income or interest to the life tenant, leaving in the principal account the sum of $109,000, which he
invested as follows:
With $66,000 he bought sixty $1,000 5 % General Obligation bonds of a southern Colorado municipality, due in
1935. The price was $1,100 for each bond.
With the balance of $43,000 he bought 6 % first mortgages on Denver real estate, appraised in each case at twice the
amount of the mortgage debt. From time to time as these
mortgages were paid off he substituted other Denver mortgages.
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During the entire administration the trustee paid the life
tenant all the interest paid to the trustee on the bonds and
mortgages, less the trustee's fee.
The administration of the trust was uneventful, except
that in 1930 the trustee foreclosed a $20,000 mortgage,
bought in the mortgaged premises for $21,000 (the amount
of principal, interest, and taxes) and held the property, which
was net unproductive, until January, 1935, when he sold it
for $30,000. In February, 1935, the life tenant died, insolvent, leaving as his only heir a minor child. At this time the
bonds were in default and worth $43,000. There had been
no loss on the mortgages.
The trustee distributed the mortgages, worth about
$23,000, $30,000 in cash derived from the sale of the land
acquired on foreclosure, and the $60,000 par value of bonds,
worth $43,000, to the guardian of the minor beneficiary.
Had the trustee made any mistakes for which he could be held
accountable? Had he paid too much or too little to the
guardian? Had the administrator of the estate of the life
tenant a right to any part of the estate?
A review of the administration of the trust indicates that
the trustee made at least four mistakes.
The first was in the allocation of the $113,000 received
by the trustee as between income and principal. You will recall that he paid the life tenant the $4,000 actually produced
by the estate while it was being administered in court. The
life tenant was entitled to income from the date of the death
of the testator, not on the basis of what was actually earned,
but rather on the basis of what should have been earned. In
other words, there should have been allocated to principal that
portion of the $113,000 which, with interest at a reasonable
rate, say 5%, for one year, would have equaled $113,000.
According to this formula the principal account should have
received $107,619, and the income account $5,381. The life
tenant was, therefore, underpaid to the extent of $1,381.
The second mistake made by the trustee was when he
invested $66,000 in the bonds of a single Colorado municipality. It is true that the bonds were of a type authorized
by law, but the rule is that although a trustee may properly

38.
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invest in a particular type of security, he must use care, skill,
and caution in selecting an investment within the type.
Among the matters which he should consider in selecting an
investment, in addition to those relating to safety of principal
and the amount and regularity of income, are (1) marketability, (2) the length of the term of the investment, (3) the
probable duration of the trust, (4) the probable condition of
the market with respect to reinvestment at the time when the
investment matures, (5) the diversification of risk, (6) the
requirements of the beneficiaries, (7) in some cases, the other
assets of the beneficiaries, and (8) the effect of the investment
in increasing or diminishing liability for taxes.
When the trustee bought a single block of bonds equal
to more than half of the value of the trust he was guilty of
negligence in failing to properly diversify, and therefore probably could have been surcharged for the loss resulting from
this investment. The trustee failed to diversify sufficiently
with respect to the type of investment, geographical location,
and date of maturity.
The third mistake made by the trustee was in paying all
the interest from the bonds to the life tenant. You will recall
that he paid $66,000 for $60,000 par value of bonds. He
should, therefore, have amortized the premium by deducting
from each interest payment and adding to principal a sum
sufficient to repay the principal for the premium advanced by
the date on which the bonds matured. In this connection,
therefore, he overpaid the life tenant by about $6,000. The
general rule in this connection is as follows: Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in
trust to pay the income to one person for a period and thereafter to pay the principal to another, is wasting property, the
trustee is under a duty to the remaindermen to amortize or to
sell the property. Wasting property includes leaseholds and
other property yielding receipts only for a specified period of
time; bonds purchased at a premium; royalties, patent rights;
interests in mines, oil and gas wells; quarries, timber lands, etc.
The fourth mistake made by the trustee was in allocating to principal all the proceeds of the sale of the land
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acquired on foreclosure. You will remember that the trustee
foreclosed a mortgage, bought in the foreclosed property at a
foreclosure sale, held it for five years, during which he was
under a duty to convert it to a legal investment as soon as
reasonably possible, and sold it for $30,000. He added the
entire $30,000 to principal. He should have allocated to
principal that portion of the proceeds which, with interest at
a reasonable rate, say 5 %, for five years, would equal
$30,000. That is to say, he should have allocated to principal the sum of $24,000 and to income the sum of $6,000.
This interesting rule, which has long been recognized,
and which probably should be applied in thousands of cases
where its very existence is unknown, has been stated in Restatement of the Law of Trusts as follows:
"Allocation on Delayed Conversion. (1) Unless it is otherwise
provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in trust to pay the
income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the
principal to another beneficiary is property which the trustee is under
a duty to sell and which produces no income or an income substantially
less than the current rate of return on trust investments, or which is
wasting property or produces an income substantially more than the
current rate of return on trust investments, and the trustee does not
immediately sell the property, the trustee should make an apportionment
of the proceeds of the sale when made, as stated in Subsection (2).
"(2) The net proceeds received from the sale of the property are
apportioned by ascertaining the sum which with interest thereon at the
current rate of return on trust investments from the day when the duty
to sell arose to the day of the sale would equal the net proceeds; and the
sum so ascertained is to be treated as principal, and the residue of the net
proceeds as income.
The net proceeds are determined by adding to the net sale
"(3)
price plus the net income received or deducting therefrom the net loss
incurred in carrying the property prior to the sale."
There were probably other mistakes for which the exec-

utor or the trustee could have been held accountable.

There

are dozens of traps into which an unwary executor or trustee

may fall. The law is complex and in many cases unsettled.
The important thing is to know that dangers exist and where
to expect them.

AGAINST BAR INTEGRATION
By ALBERT L. VOGL, of the Denver Bar
HE term "Integrated Bar" is generally used to designate

Tbar

associations established by legislative acts or judicial

orders as distinguished from voluntary bar associations.
Membership in integrated bars is compulsory.
The usual procedure to establish an "Integrated Bar" is
to have the Legislature adopt a statute authorizing the incorporation of the bar, and vesting in this incorporated bar various powers, such as power to collect dues from all enrolled
members of the bar to defray the expenses of carrying on the
work of the corporation; power to appoint a governing
board; power to hear complaints against members of the bar
and to recommend to the Supreme Court action upon such
complaints. Sometimes the procedure is varied and the Legislature authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe rules and
regulations for organizing and governing the bar association
and to prescribe the powers thereof; again, in other cases the
Supreme Court has provided for an integrated bar, without
action by the Legislature.
The essential features of all bar integration plans are,
first, that the bar organizations become officially a part of the
State government; second, that membership therein is compulsory and every lawyer must pay an excise tax to support
the integrated bar. The benefits generally claimed for this
form of organization are: (1) That integrated bar associations are sufficiently financed to carry on the work of the association; (2) that since every lawyer must contribute to the
funds of the association, a considerably larger percentage of
lawyers actively participate in the work of integrated bars
than participate in the activities of voluntary associations;
(3) that because of (1) and (2) the integrated associations
work more effectively, and particularly are more efficient in
compelling observation of bar ethics.
Before considering these supposed benefits, it is appropriate that we should examine the underlying principles
involved in bar integration. Legislation providing for bar
integration has generally been sustained as an appropriate
exercise of the police powers (In re Gibson, 4 Pac. 2d 643).
Those, therefore, who advocate bar integration must contend
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that the bar needs policing and then argue, that the bar is the
proper organization to appoint the police. If a trades union,
let us say, the United Mine Workers, should propose a law
providing that (1) no one could work in or about a coal mine
in Colorado except he joins the union and continues his membership by regular payment of dues to be fixed by the union;
(2) the union elects its own officers; (3) the union adopts its
own rules and regulations defining what is ethical in coal mining and the union shall have full control of its funds, that
union would be proposing nothing different, in principle,
from the proposition of an integrated bar. In all other professions or trades which are regulated under the police powers,
the appointment of the members of the regulating body is left
to the governor, sometimes with the approval of the senate,
or to some other governmental agency. Thus the governor
appoints the medical board, the dental board and he appoints
the public utilities board with the consent of the senate. The
advocates of bar integration, however, propose to invoke the
police powers of the State to create the integrated bar and give
it powers to levy excise taxes, then they propose to vest in the
bar-not representing the people or the State-the power to
name the governing board of the bar, which will have wide
powers, including those of disbursing the proceeds of this
excise tax.
The bar is a part of the judicial branch of the government and, obviously, if under the police powers of the State
there is to be a governing board appointed for it, the appointment should be with that body which the people have elected
to have general superintending control over the judicial
branch of the government, the Supreme Court. Any proposition of a governmental agency, not under the control of
elected officials, being vested with police powers and taxing
powers, and the power to spend the proceeds of taxes levied
by itself, is so new and startling that it must come as a shock
to thosi who still approve the general principles of democratic
government.
The advocates of integration of the bar usually contrast
the inefficiency of bar associations with the control of the medical profession by the American Medical Association and by
the State and local medical associations. It should be noted
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that these medical associations are not "integrated" associations-but are voluntary and selective. If these voluntary
medical associations have elevated the standards of the medical
profession above those of the legal profession (which, I submit, is open to very serious question), the alleged success in
that regard is, therefore, no argument that by substituting
compulsory bar associations for the voluntary associations,
the standards of the bar will be raised to the standards supposed to be achieved by the medical profession, acting through
voluntary associations.
Let us now examine some of the reasons urged for the
establishment of an integrated bar. It is claimed that recent
events have emphasized the necessity of curbing unethical
activities of members of the bar; that the legal profession is
losing the confidence of the public by reason of such unethical
activities.
The unethical conduct of some members of the bar has
been exaggerated by propaganda of the press and by bar association officials advocating bar integration. There has been an
increase of criminal activities resulting from a World War, a
major depression, sensational romanticizing of crime by press
and movies, and this has centered public attention on "crime."
The press has drawn attention to the lawyers-in order to
divert attention of the public from the part the press has
played in the increase in crime. So the lawyers have taken the
blame and bar association officials interested in bar integration have joined in the propaganda against lawyers. The loss
of public confidence is traceable to three main causes: (a)
Present legal procedure is cumbersome and impracticable and
the lawyers have not remedied these defects; (b) the 1929
economic breakdown was in many respects traceable to banking and corporate dishonesty and lawyers were the advisers of
those responsible for those dishonesties, and bar associations
are not actively denouncing such legal advisers; (c) excessive
dramatic publicity and exaggeration of the activities of attorneys representing the underworld has resulted in the public
blaming the bar not only for its share in the handling of the
problem of the underworld, but also for the incompetencies of
the police and other officials. No one disputes that the bar
is vulnerable in the matter of the relation of some of its mem-
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bers to the underworld, but those opposed to bar integration
claim, as above stated, that this relationship has been exaggerated and sometimes used as a herring across the trail to divert
attention from some equally sinister connections of members
of the bar with the upperworld of high finance. The present
methods of lawyers who represent defendants in criminal
cases differ very little from the methods used in the nineteenth
century. The outcry against the lawyers, therefore, is not
due to a new technique in criminal defense, but is due to an
aroused sentiment against crime increases.
It is next urged that if reforms are needed in the bar,
lawyers, because of their training and experience, are best
fitted to solve the problems involved.
The primary interest of lawyers as a class (though not
always individually) is in the practice of law as their profession and therefore their self-interest will, in many cases, outweigh their judgment as to what is for the social good. In
principle it is wrong for practicing lawyers to sit in judgment
on their competitors, i. e., other practicing lawyers. The responsibility and function of disciplining recreant lawyers
belongs in the courts and the courts can always call to their
assistance in such matters such members of the bar as the
courts may determine are best suited to be of assistance in such
matters. The courts represent the public, in whose interest
such reforms are to be made. Why divide the responsibility?
Next it is contended that an adequately financed bar
association is necessary if it is to effectually enforce high standards of ethical conduct in the profession, and that adequate
financing of bar associations can only be accomplished
through integration of the bar. Obviously it is a confession
of weakness when bar officials admit they are not able to get
voluntary members into the association, and therefore ask for
compulsory measures to increase membership.
What constitutes an adequately financed bar association
is a matter of opinion; already we hear murmurs against high
salaries paid by the American Bar Association and excessive
expenditures for propaganda put out by that organization.
An integrated bar is just another bureaucracy-an N. R. A.
among lawyers-and will be in the control of not the best
element of the bar, but of the professional bureaucrat or office-
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seeker. Compulsory payment of bar association dues will be
the inspiration for the establishment of a swarm of paid office
holders in the associations.
The advocates of bar integration contend that every lawyer should be a member of his State bar association and should
participate in the work of that association; that this can be
brought about only when every lawyer is compelled to pay
dues to the association.
Quality and not quantity is what is needed in bar association work; every lawyer who pays property and/or income
taxes does not actively participate in political activities, and
because every lawyer has to pay a membership fee in a bar
association does not guarantee that every lawyer will participate in its work. Under voluntary associations less than half
of those who pay dues, regularly attend bar meetings and are
active in the work of the association; probably under an integrated bar the result will be the same. The official personnel
will probably be about the same as under a voluntary association; if not-as you will force into the associations those
whose unorthodox professional standards now prevent them
from becoming members of voluntary associations-you may
get a less desirable official personnel than you now have. The
only thing that an integrated bar will assure in this regard
will be increased funds for the association.
It is claimed that an integrated bar is more effectual in
disciplinary activities than is a voluntary association.
In those states where in recent years an integrated bar has
been established, there has been more disciplinary activity
than was formerly manifested, probably because conditions
made necessary increased activities along such lines. In Colorado-without an integrated bar-there has been more activity in this respect in the past five years than in the prior twenty-five years; which shows that an integrated bar is not the
only way of arousing disciplinary activities when the same
become necessary. Primarily the duty of maintaining ethical
standards is one for the courts. The courts are elected by the
people-or are appointed by those elected by the people-and
are therefore the people's agency for administering disciplinary measures to unethical members of the bar. Bar association
committees or governing boards are not elected by, or in any
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manner responsible to the people, therefore they are not likely
to have the confidence of the people. Give the Supreme Court
the fullest powers in matters of discipline, with full authority
to call to its assistance permanent committees appointed by it,
or individuals selected by it from time to time. The results
will be more satisfactory, there will be no division of responsibility, and the public will have more confidence in the administration of discipline by its own elected officials than it
will have where the responsibility for the initial investigation
is in the hands of a bar committee in no manner subject to the
control of the people, and often elected or appointed by a
small clique in the bar association itself.
It is generally conceded that judicial procedure needs
amending, so that justice can be more certainly and speedily
administered with less likelihood of such administration being
frustrated by intricate technicalities. The advocates of bar
integration claim that the lawyer's training adapts him to the
formulation of such amendment. They claim that unless
such amendments are made, the public confidence in our courts
will be undermined, and that this work must have the united
efforts of all lawyers, and that this united activity can only be
secured by an integrated bar.
All will agree that a legal system where four to nine
months can be used up in determining how properly to state
a cause of action and a defense thereto, is inept and not a system to be proud of. However, the work of reforming judicial
procedure is not one to be undertaken by mass attack; it requires the careful study of analytical minds peculiarly adapted
to that kind of activity. Our present judicial procedure is
almost entirely the product of legal minds, therefore many
doubt whether the work of amending judicial procedure
should be entrusted to lawyers alone; it is contended by many
that this work can only be accomplished with any degree of
success by groups composed of well-trained representatives of
various phases of our industrial, financial and social life, in
which groups lawyers should not be the controlling majority.
Even if lawyers are to undertake this work, obviously they
should be selected-not elected by majority vote of members
of an integrated bar. Without an integrated bar, the Supreme
Court of the United States found no difficulty in securing all
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of the assistance it required among the highest types of lawyers to aid it in the work of preparing for submission to Congress new rules of procedure for the Federal courts. The Supreme Court of each State could secure similar cooperation
within the State whenever it was desired. Of course the
question of finance comes in. If the lawyers must finance
either the work of disciplining the bar or of reforming judicial procedure-logically, the State should finance it-then
lawyers could be required to pay to the Supreme Court an
annual license fee which could constitute a separate fund
solely for such purposes as enforcing disciplinary measures,
studying and formulating improvements in the procedure,
etc. This would not entail the setting up of an integrated bar
organization with numerous petty secretaries, committees,
officials, etc., with legalistic authority to regiment and dictate
to the bar.
At least let us try this method before we submit to this
process of compulsory bar organization and surrender the valuable social features of voluntary bar associations.
There are those advocates of bar integration who claim
that these social features can be retained under an integrated
bar. Obviously this claim is erroneous. The funds of an
integrated bar are proceeds of an excise tax and cannot be
expended for purposes other than public purposes.
Whatever may be the justification for integration of the
bars in such states as New York and California, no condition
exists in Colorado which calls for such drastic disciplining of
the bar of this State. Unless more convincing reasons are presented than have been heretofore advanced, Colorado should
hold on to its voluntary associations and refuse to be stampeded into compulsory associations by the paid advocates sent
out by the American Bar Association.
Some of the best public services which lawyers have rendered to the American Commonwealth have resulted from the
free individualistic habits of thought of the American lawyer.
Regimentation of American lawyers in trade unions disguised
as "integrated bars" may-without improving either the ethics of the bar or the efficiency of judicial procedure-stultify
this freedom of thought and speech among lawyers subjected
to this regimentation, and result in substituting Boeotian
mediocrity for scintillating omnilucence.

INTERPLEADER-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PROPERLY DENIED-FINDINGS OF FACT NECESSARY BEFORE DISMISSAL OF CLAIM-E. G. Vanatta vs. Grant McFerson, as State Bank

Examiner of the State of Colorado in charge of the Yampa Valley
Bank; The Board of County Commissioners of Lake County,
Colorado, and John Dubovsky, Intervener-No. 13594-Decided
November 18, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
One John Dubovsky deposited money in Yampa Valley Bank and
received time certificate No. 3513. He lost that certificate and the bank,
in lieu thereof, issued certificate No. 4012 to one Katie Dubovsky for
$1,500. John Dubovsky was in financial difficulties and the bank officer suggested that the new certificate be issued in the name of his sister.
The bank became insolvent and was placed in the hands of the Bank
Commissioner for liquidation.
County Commissioners of Lake County filed claim with the Bank
Commissioner on a judgment obtained against John Dubovsky. Vanatta, as assignee of Katie Dubovsky, also filed a claim with the Bank
Commissioner.
Then the Bank Commissioner filed his complaint in interpleader
and asked permission to pay the money represented by the certificate into
the registry of the court and be discharged.
County Commissioners filed answer, setting up estoppel, based on
its judgment against John Dubovsky and claimed the District Court
was without jurisdiction. To that answer Vanatta filed a demurrer,
which was sustained. Judgment in interpleader was entered, the Bank
Commissioner directed to pay the money into the registry of the court
and then the County Commissioners filed an amended answer and crosscomplaint against Vanatta. Vanatta also filed an answer and crosscomplaint against the County Commissioners, to which the commissioners demurred. Vanatta then moved for judgment on the pleadings,
which motion was overruled and his claim dismissed.
John Dubovsky intervened, alleging that the certificate held by his
sister belonged to him and that his sister had no interest in it whatsoever aAd prayed that the court order the money represented by the certificate, subject to the equity of the County Commissioners, be paid to
him.
Held-That the motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly overruled but Vanatta's claim was erroneously dismissed. The certificate stood in the name of Katie Dubovsky, assignee of Vanatta, but it
is alleged that she had no interest in and to the certificate, which was
merely taken in her name for purposes of concealment and hindrance of
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John's creditors. This presents an issue upon which a determination is
to be had of the facts. The claim should be restated and further proceedings had to determine the facts.

AUTOMOBILES--SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE UNDER GUEST STATUTE

-Schlessinger vs. Gertrude Miller by Her Next Friend Sam Miller
13612-Decided November 18, 1935--Opinion by Mr.
-No.
Justice Burke.
Plaintiff, riding in the back seat of an automobile as a guest of the
defendant, sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident and
brought suit to recover damages. Testimony showed that the defendant
was driving between 40 and 45 miles per hour on one of the principal
streets in Denver, Colorado, at about 11:00 or 11:30 P. M.; that the
defendant was driving with his left hand, his right- arm about his girl
companion in the front seat and was in the act of kissing the girl "a
split second before accident occurred." Prior to accident, the defendant
had been warned repeatedly by his passengers of the danger incurred by
his conduct, but he "just laughed."
Verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.

Held, Affirmed-The evidence justified a finding that the defendant was guilty of negligence, consisting of a "willful and wanton disregard of the rights" of the plaintiff. The court points out that when
one is too intoxicated to drive safely, "puts himself at the wheel," and
"takes the road," he is guilty of "willful and wanton disregard of the
rights of all persons" regardless of the guest statute concerning intoxication; that "The common knowledge and experience of mankind makes
this language equally applicable to one so intoxicated with love-making
as to drive with one hand at an excessive rate of speed on a thoroughfare
and greet repeated warnings with indifference and laughter."
CONTRACTS - TORTS -ELECTION
BETWEEN Two INCONSISTENT
REMEDIES-DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF TORT ACTION
BARS ACTION ON CONTRACT SAME TRANSACTION-Florence G.
Wheeler vs. Frank J. Wilkins-No. 13634-Decided November
18, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff filed an action to recover on an alleged fraudulent stock
selling deal. Defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained and
plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint to which defendant moved
to strike on the grounds that plaintiff had changed her cause of action
from tort to contract. Motion granted and the action dismissed without
prejudice. The plaintiff did not seek a review of that judgment, but in
about ten days started a new suit based on the promise of the defendant
to refund the money paid for the worthless stock. The defendant set
up several defenses, including a general denial, statute of limitations,
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election of remedies, etc. At the close of plaintiff's case, the court
granted the defendant's motion for a non-suit.
Held, Affirmed-The original action in tort was dismissed without
prejudice and, since plaintiff failed to have that judgment reviewed, the
matters there involved became res adjudicata. Plaintiff's election to sue
in tort is irrevocable and a bar to the present suit on an alleged contract.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Bouck
vigorously dissent. Mr. Chief Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck
rendered written dissenting opinions.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTER 118,
SESSION LAWS OF COLORADO, 1933-No. 13787-Decided November 18, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This is an original proceeding before the Colorado Supreme Court
wherein Governor Edwin C. Johnson, pursuant to authority contained
in Section 3, Article 6, of the Constitution, submitted six interrogatories
to the Supreme Court relative to the constitutionality of Chapter 118,
Session Laws of Colorado, 1933, which, among other things, provides
for regulations, restrictions and conditions under which food may be
prepared and sold for human consumption.
Certain merchants of Colorado claimed that the act in question
contravened their constitutional rights to conduct restaurants and prior
to the effective date of the statute filed their bill of complaint in the
United States District Court of Colorado against the Governor and
Attorney General and the State Board of Health seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the statute. A three-judge Federal court was convened
to consider the matter. After a hearing, the court issued its restraining
order, by a decision of two to one; Judge J. Foster Symes, one of the
three judges, opposed the restraining order. Then the Governor of the
State of Colorado submitted his interrogatories to the Supreme Court
of the State of Colorado.
Held-The statute is constitutional.
It is the expression of the

representative branch of the government which has authority to determine what is requisite to promote and preserve health, safety and morals.
The sovereign, under its police powers, may fairly and reasonably restrict
the use of property. The unrestricted privilege to engage in business or
to conduct it as one pleases is not guaranteed by the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT-PHYSICAL FORCE NOT NECESSARY-The
Crew-Beggs Dry Goods Company, a Corporationvs. Lea BayleNo. 13601-Decided November 12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff sued the defendant (plaintiff in error) for damages on
account of false imprisonment. Plaintiff claimed that she was in de-
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fendant's department store as a customer when an employee of the
defendant stopped her and charged that plaintiff was a shoplifter. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
Errors assigned: (1) Overruling demurrer to complaint; (2)
overruling demurrer to evidence at close of plaintiff's case; (3) denial
of motion for a directed verdict.
Held, Affirmed-Physical force not required to complete a false
imprisonment; any restraint, either by force or fear, without justification, is sufficient.
AUTOMOBILES-PROXIMATE CAUSE-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES-NEGLI-

GENCE OF DRIVER NOT IMPUTED TO THE PASSENGER-VERDICT
ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE NOT DISTURBED--Fred Knaus vs.

Lois Yoder, by Fred Yoder and Grace Yoder, as Her Father and
Mother and Next Friends Herein-No. 13613-Decided November 12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff sued the defendant (plaintiff in error) to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, travelling west, was struck by
the defendant's automobile east of the intersection of a north and south
street. The defendant had been travelling north but made a wide right
turn to go east just before the accident occurred. Evidence was conflicting as to whether or not the collision occurred on plaintiff's or defendant's side of the street.
Plaintiff's injuries consisted of nervous shock, lacerations of the
face, permanent disfigurement, broken nose with permanent injury to
nasal passages and likely to become worse. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff in sum of $8,750.
Errors assigned: (1) Erroneous instructions, and (2) excessive
damages.
Held, Affirmed-Proximate cause of the accident on conflicting
evidence is for the jury. Amount of compensation to be awarded for
such serious injuries also for the jury; the amount awarded does not
reflect prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury. Negligence of
driver not imputed to the plaintiff who was a passenger. Mr. Justice
Bouck dissents.
MINES--CONFLICTING CLAIMS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-Kenney

vs. Eccer-No. 13615-Decided November 4, 1935--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Campbell.
This is a controversy between the parties concerning the ownership
of certain mining claims, particularly over conflicting locations. The
trial court in its findings held that the only question in controversy was
whether the defendants were estopped from claiming the right to loca-

DICTA
tion as against the plaintiffs by reason of an alleged relationship as landlord and tenant. The trial court held for the plaintiffs:
1. Where there is a conflict as to priority of mining location
the defense that the relation of landlord and tenant existed at the time
the tenant made an adverse location is.good, provided the evidence shows
that the relation of landlord and tenant existed.
2. There was competent evidence to sustain the finding of the
trial court that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist.
3. There was competent evidence to prove that the defendants
located the mining claim before the relation of landlord and tenant came
into existence and hence they are not estopped.
4. Evidence examined and sufficient to sustain the judgment of

the lower court.--Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-FIDELITY BOND-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO RECOVER ON-MOTION FOR NON-SUIT-American Surety Com-

pany vs. Capitol Building and Loan Association-No. 13479Decided October 21, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Capitol Company sued the Insurance Company below upon
a fidelity bond, claiming that an employee had embezzled monies. Defendant made motion for non-suit below, which was denied and defendant stood on the motion and judgment was entered for plaintiff.
1. The motion for non-suit should have been granted.
2. The plaintiff failed to establish the alleged cause of action.
3. Where a fidelity bond provides for liability through any dishonest act of the employee, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff seeking to
recover to show that a loss occurred through a dishonest act.
4. The evidence wholly failed to show such.
5.
Mere negligence producing a loss will not establish liability
under the bond.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REOPENING

CASE ON COMMISSION'S

OWN MOTION AND AWARDING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS-FINDINGS OF COMMISSION CONCLUSIVE ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE

-- SUPREME COURT RULE 32-Moffat Coal Company and the

Employer's Mutual Insurance Company vs. Pete Cometa and The
Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 13827-Decided No-

vember 12, 1935--Opinionby Mr. Justice Burke.
Employee injured in an accident arising out of and within the
scope of his employment awarded 15% permanent partial disability
benefits. Later the case was reopened on the Commission's own motion
and disability benefits increased to 20%. Still later the Commission
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again reopened the case, took additional testimony and on the grounds
of changed conditions increased disability benefits to 25 %.
Held, Affirmed-The evidence is conflicting and the Commission's
findings are sufficient and conclusive. The court directs attention to
Supreme Court Rule 32 to effect that each alleged "error should be
separately alleged and particularly specified."

AUTOMOBILE-MANSLAUGHTER---CAUSING

DEATH WHILE

UNDER

INFLUENCE OF INTOXICANTS--Stevens vs. People-No. 13761
-Decided November 4, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Butler.
Stevens was convicted under Chapter 95, Session Laws of 1923, of
causing death of another while driving an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
1. The word "intoxicated" in title is synonymous with the
words "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" as Used in body of
act.

2. Hence, the title covers the body of the act.
3. Evidence sufficient to support verdict.
4. Not improper to show that defendant ran away and rendered no assistance to the injured.
5. Experiment made after the accident, made under like condition, admissible.
6. Proper to show that defendant's attorney tried to change testimony of defendant by making improper suggestions in regard to not
drinking.
7. Rejection of certain evidence was proper.---Judgmentaffirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.

INSURANCE-CONTRACTORS BOND-EVIDENCE-MOTION TO STRIKE

-ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS--TRUSTS--Ohio Casualty Company
vs. Colorado.Portland Cement Company-No. 13505-Decided
November 4, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Cement Company recovered judgment below against the insurance company upon a bond given by a contractor to pay for materials
used on highway construction contract, the contractor having defaulted
in payment.
1. It was proper to strike from the answer portions of application where the bond itself provided that the application was no part of
the bond.
2. It was proper to strike from the answer all reference to other
contracts and bonds not involved herein.
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3. An assignment of error that "the judgment is contrary to and
against the evidence and the law applicable thereto" is not a proper one
and does not comply with Rule 32, which requires the specific assignment of each error.
4. The bank account of the. contractor was his property, not
subject to any trust.--Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT POLICY-OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES-EXCESSIVE VERDICT-INSTRUCTIONS--Federal Life Insurance Com-

pany vs. Lorton-No. 13604-Decided November 4, 1935Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Lorton, as administrator, recovered $1,400 for death of one Busby
on accident policy which provided against liability if death occurred
while performing occupational duties.
Deceased was killed in wrecking a building on a ranch. He was
only employed as a ranch hand to feed cattle and do chores.
1. Deceased was not engaged in an occupational duty when he
was killed.
2. Instructions not set forth in abstract of record will -not be
considered.
3. Verdict is not excessive. While the policy was for $1,000
face, still it provided for an increase of 10% each additional year after
the first year and the evidence shows it had been in force for four successive years; hence $1,400 was the proper measure of liability.--Judgment affirmed.
MURDER-ACCESSORY

AFTER THE FACT-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI-

DENCE-Howard vs. The People-No. 13755-Decided November 4, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butter.
Howard was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the
murder of Charles Rubin by Sam Jones. He seeks a reversal of the
sentence.
1. Under the Colorado statute, a person can be prosecuted as an
accessory after the fact even before the principal has been convicted.
2. It is no defense to charge of being accessory after the fact in a
murder case that the murderer himself had not been formally charged
with the murder.
3.
The findings of the court were amply supported by the evidence.
4. Where one is charged with murder and is acquitted, such acquittal does not bar a prosecution against him as accessory after the fact.
-- Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.
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AEROPLANE-Industrial

Commission of Colorado et al. vs. Ule-No. 13668-Decided
August 19, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Ule was employed as a woodworker at Denver Municipal Airport.
He worked principally in the dope shed where dope was applied to
bodies and wings of aeroplanes by means of a spray gun. At various
times he showed evidence of dope poisoning which did not interfere
with his work, but at one time he was subjected to an unusual and
excessive exposure from the dope due to use on a hurry-up job from
the effects of which he died.
The Commission held that the death was not due to accident but
to occupational disease and on appeal to the District Court the District
Court vacated the award and remanded the case to the Commission with
directions to enter an award.
1. An occupational disease is one contracted in the usual and
ordinary course of events, which from the common experience of humanity is known to be incident to a particular employment.
2. The evidence shows that the serious disability which resulted
in claimant's death was not the natural and reasonably to be expected
result of his employment; nor that his disease was contracted in the
usual course of events. The exposures the claimant was subjected to
were double those previously used and produced effects that were not
intended, foreseen or expected, and hence it was an accident.-Judgment
affirmed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CONTRIBUTION

BETWEEN PARTNERS-

FOREIGN JUDGMENT-Davison et al. vs. Tucker-No. 13548-

Decided October 7, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiffs below contend that this is an action for contribution
between partners, while defendant insists that it is an action on a foreign judgment and is barred by the statute of limitations. The trial
court adopted the latter view.
1. Where the action is brought by partners for contribution
against another partner on a foreign judgment that the plaintiffs have
been compelled to pay, the action is one for contribution and is not an
action upon a foreign judgment.
2. Hence, the statute of limitations with reference to bringing
suit upon a foreign judgment does not apply.--Judgment reversed.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE-MINIMUM
-- COMPENSATION-Roeder as Trustee vs. The Industrial Com-

mission-No. 13739-DecidedJune 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Claimant, while employed by the company, was injured in an
accident arising out of and in the course of that employment, and
was totally disabled for approximately seventeen weeks. At the time
of injury he was earning $18.48 per week, but due to unemployment
his average weekly wage for the year preceding the injury was only
$1.67 per week. The Commission awarded him compensation at the
rate of $5 per week, which award was affirmed by the Court below.
1. Section 4445, C. L. 1921, as amended, provides, among other
things, that the injured employee shall receive 50% of his average weekly
wages so long as the disability is total, not to exceed a maximum of
$14 per week, and not less than a minimum of $5 per week,
unless the employee's wages shall be less than $5 per week, in which
event, he shall receive compensation equal to his average weekly wages.
2. The clause "unless the employee's wages shall be less than
$5 per week" means wages at the time of the accident and not average
weekly wages.
3. The word "wages" means the money rate which employee
was actually earning at the time of the accident and where this money
rate was not less than $5, but his average weekly wages for the
year were $1.87, the employee was entitled to an allowance of the
minimum of $5 per week.--Judgment alfirmed.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Chairman Schaetzel requests:

"Will you please put an item in an early edition of the DICTA
asking the attorneys to be sure to sign their names as such in all matters
in which they appear, such as foreclosures through the Public Trustee,
appearances before the Industrial, Public Utilities and Banking Commissions, also on all incorporations filed with the Secretary of State.

"Our Unauthorized Practice of the Law Committee is making a

check of the activities of laymen before all boards, commissions, and the
Public Trustee and the Secretary of State's office. A check is now being
made of the Public Trustee's office, and from cursory examination, less
than twenty per cent of the total number of foreclosures have lawyers'
names attached to the proceedings. It makes it much more difficult for
our committee to investigate any unlawful practice* when the attorneys'
names are not connected with the proceedings."
*J. P. courts excepted, Jake.
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CODE OF LAWS, U. S. A.
By F. D. STACKHOUSE, Clerk, District Court
The Library of the District Court is today in receipt of a "Code
of Laws of the United States of America, in force as of January 3,
1935."
This makes a volume of more than 3,000 pages and we are indebted to Congressman Lawrence Lewis for his thoughtfulness in
sending this book for our library. Very truly yours,
F. D. STACKHOUSE, Clerk, District Court.
"DID YOU KNOW"
A Denver ordinance prohibits distribution of handbills which will
probably be thrown in the street and "frighten or injure or endanger
horses or other animals." Very truly yours,
CARLE WHITEHEAD.

This ordinance is more honored in the breach than observance,
judging from the looks of my yard and porch several mornings each
week.-Ye Ed.

WE RECOMMEND

The Ames Lumber
Company

"PARK-RITE"
PARKING

Lumber - Coal - Paint
Building Hardware
Prompt Delivery

Lawyers and visitors given special attention. Your cars protected. Corteous service. Always welcome.

2506 W. Colfax Ave.

KEystone 3421

1327 Stout St.

Denver, Colorado
MAin 9791

Holiday Greetings

ALLEN REDEKER & COMPANY
University Building

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
KEystone 4784

Central Business College

Denver, Colorado

1450 Tremont Place

competent office workers, experienced or expertly-trained beginners, call
MAin 3094. There is no charge to Employer or Employee.
A WORD TO THOSE ALREADY EMPLOYED--Our night school courses are
especially adapted to the needs of each student. Our rates are the lowest.
Fr Full Information, Call MAIn 3094
For
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THIS year
heat with, gas

Lue Truly Modern Fuel
Ask our engineers for an estimate on the moderate
cost of heating your home with gas. Then arrange
for immediate installation, that you may enioy
complete freedom from ALL heating worries this

twinter.

Thousands of OTHER homes enjoy the
advantages of GAS HEAT-why not YOUR home?

Public Service Company of Colorado

TRUST BANKING
for.

Corporations and Individuals
Services to Corporations
Trustee under Corporate Mortgages
Depository for Protective Committees . . .
Transfer Agent and Registrar for Corporate
Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.
Stock
.

Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates
Trustee under Wills . . . Trustee of Living
*Trusts and Life Insurance Trusts . . . Safekeeping of Securities.

Escrows

BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.

THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
Each of the above banks are
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

II.

